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ABSTRACT I  o f f e r  a  r e s p o n s e  a n d  c o u n t e r  a r g u m e n t  t o  J .  B a i r d  C a l l i c o t t ’ s “ P r o v o c a t i o n s ”  p i e c e  i n  
Environmental Humanities, volume 2. I argue that the historical narrative that Callicott derives from Aristotle 
regarding the development of philosophical thought from natural philosophy to social and moral concerns, is 
not the best way to conceive of the project of the Presocratics. Nor does this narrative offer us the best way 
to conceive of the distinctive tasks of the environmental arts (a term which I argue is to be preferred to the 
environmental  humanities)  and  their  relation  to  the  sciences.  I  offer  a  different  model,  inspired  by  the 
Heraclitean notion of unity in opposition, which conceives the task of the arts as the common articulation of 
our myriad ways of being in the world and the task of the various sciences as the exploration of the world 
that is manifest in and through those ways of being. This model allows us to see how we might aim towards 
unity in opposition rather than a fusion of the two cultures. On this basis I make some proposals concerning 
the long-term and more immediate institutional and pedagogical consequences of this view and reflect upon 
the challenges facing my teaching on the UEA Master’s in Environmental Sciences and Humanities. 
 
 
In  the  latest  issue  of  the  journal  Environmental  Humanities,  in  a  section  entitled  
“Provocations,” the environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott offers what he describes as a 
“NeoPresocratic Manifesto,” a vision for developing an integrated worldview that will guide 
future academic work in both the sciences and humanities.
1 In essence, Callicott revisits the 
two cultures debate with an eye to the trends that have shaped environmental humanities over 
the past half-century or so. These are an acute, frequently enlightening and wide-ranging set of 
observations, made by a thinker whose work often helped to spark and cultivate the debates in 
question. Yet Callicott encompasses his observations in an impressive large-scale  historical 
narrative, which I think is fundamentally misconceived and which, I contend, sets us off on 
entirely the wrong foot. Suitably provoked, I offer these brief considerations as a counterpoint 
to Callicott’s view, followed by some reflections on how this alternative vision might work in 
practice.  
What  Callicott’s  manifesto  proposes  is  that  we  should  be  working  to  facilitate  the 
recurrence of a movement in the history of ideas that he thinks has taken place at least twice 
before. That movement is from the development of a revolutionary new natural philosophy to a 
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concomitant revolution in social and moral thought. The Presocratic philosophers, Callicott 
contends,  were  primarily  interested  in  natural  philosophy,  initiating  a  brand  new  way  of 
inquiring into the natural world that did not simply rely on myth and religious vision. This 
inquiry then opened up questions and provided concepts for the investigation of social and 
moral life, pursued by Socrates and later Greek thinkers in tandem with natural philosophy. In 
particular, the atomism and determinism of some Presocratic philosophers provoked counter 
arguments from Plato and Aristotle, while others tried to mould a ‘social ontology’ to fit the 
preceding  ‘natural  ontology.’  The  move  from  natural  philosophy  to  social  and  moral 
philosophy was repeated in the early modern era, when Galilean, Cartesian and Newtonian 
natural science again preceded a correlative revolution in moral philosophy, represented by 
figures such as Hobbes, Hume and Kant. The consequences of this second movement seem to 
have  been  generally  more  negative  than  the  first,  resulting  in  the  entrenched  atomistic 
individualism of modern social thought. What Callicott advocates is the cultivation of a third 
such move, from the vision of holistic continuum generated by the physics and ecology of the 
‘second scientific revolution’ to a social thought that recognises the “robust ontology of social 
wholes.”
2 
In broad outline this is a familiar and very powerful story. The claims for conceptual 
movement from natural philosophy to social philosophy are certainly somewhat too strong, but 
I do not want to contest the idea that there have been such moves in many specific and limited 
cases.
3 What I want to argue is that this is not a good way of looking at what the Presocratics 
initiated and that a closer look at some of their work can serve as a much better model for the 
future of the environmental humanities. Callicott explicitly takes his narrative from Aristotle’s 
retrospective reconstruction of the progress of Greek thought. He takes Presocratic ‘natural 
philosophy’ to be concerned above all with determining the so-called ‘material cause.’  If we 
attempt to bracket Aristotle’s account for a moment, many other intriguing possibilities for 
understanding the overall project of the Presocratics present themselves. One of these is that 
they were attempting to articulate what takes place when the world becomes manifest to us in 
the first place. They were less concerned to determine the basic causes at work in the world 
that has become manifest and far more concerned with what happens to bring about the very 
manifestation of the world.
4 
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2 Some time ago Freya Matthews beautifully sketched out something like the integrated NeoSpinozist 
view that Callicott is calling for. See, The Ecological Self  (London: Routledge, 1991). 
3 Conceptual movement is of course also possible the other way around, that is, from moral and 
humanistic concerns to the idea of nature. In fact, R. G. Collingwood made a good case for thinking 
that this is historically the more usual course of influence. See, The Idea of Nature (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1945) for the case made in broad historical terms and An Essay on Metaphysics, revised edition 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), Part IIIc, for a fascinating account of the changes in the primary 
reference of ‘causation’ from influence on historical action to a concept of natural science. 
4 Such a possibility is, on my reading, roughly what Heidegger argued for in his many readings of the 
early Greek thinkers. Heidegger receives short shrift in Callicott’s piece. At the very start he is accused 
of ignoring the Aristotelian distinction between ‘first’ philosophy (metaphysics) as first in the 
hierarchical order of thought and natural philosophy as first in the order of time.  In fact, what 
Heidegger argues is that Aristotle was confused about what Presocratic philosophy was trying to 
achieve and that it was indeed first in the sense of fundamentally concerned with truth as the Greaves, Environmental Arts as First Philosophy /  
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I will not try to establish such a general reading of Presocratic philosophy here. If it can 
be made at all plausible then it seems to me that this would open up the possibility that the 
basic concerns of the Presocratics were far more in line with the concerns of contemporary 
environmental humanities than with the research programmes of contemporary natural science. 
Instead, I want to take a moment to put forward some rather speculative, anachronistic, but 
hopefully provocative thoughts inspired by one Presocratic philosopher, Heraclitus. The hope 
is  that  these  speculations  might  refresh  the  two  cultures  debate  in  the  era  of  global 
environmental concern.  
Heraclitus  is  known  as  the  thinker  of  continuous  flux.  A  prime  candidate  for 
rehabilitation perhaps, in Callicott’s project to cultivate a worldview of integrated continuum. 
But as least as important, if not far more important for Heraclitus, was the idea of unity in 
strife.
5 Here are a few of the most pertinent fragments:  
 
It is the opposite which is good for us.  
DK 8 
 
Couples  are  things  whole  and  not  whole,  what  is  drawn  together  and  what  is  drawn 
asunder, the harmonious and discordant. The one is made up of all things, and all things 
issue from the one. DK 10 
 
Men do not know how that which is drawn in different directions harmonises with itself. 
The harmonious structure of the world depends upon opposite tension like that of the bow 
and the lyre.  
DK 51 
 
Each of these fragments is of course the occasion for a great deal of scholarly strife, and as 
always much hangs on the various surviving versions of the Greek texts and the intricacies of 
translation. Luckily the point I want to make rests upon the basic tenor of these fragments 
rather than such intricacies. It is that here we find another model for thinking about the unity of 
the  sciences  and  humanities,  contrasting  with  the  “seamless  union  of  natural  and  moral 
philosophy” that Callicott hopes we can recover if we “reunite those two cultures and fuse 
them into one.”
6 On the contrary, I suggest, if there is to be unity between the sciences and 
humanities,  it  will  most  profitably  be  seen  as  a  unity  in  opposition,  between  intellectual 
projects that have quite distinct and sometimes opposing aims.  
My own way of understanding what is essential to this opposition is to think of the two 
projects as involving, on the one hand the thematic exposition of various aspects of the world 
and the elaboration of how they fit together (sciences), and on the other hand, the attempt to 
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manifestation of the world, the truth that allows for all later inquiry into what it is that becomes 
manifest, including natural philosophy and metaphysics. In Heidegger’s view early Greek thinking was 
not at all the prototype for modern scientific research projects, as it is for Callicott. Rather, the 
scientific drive towards a unified theory of everything is first made possible by the metaphysics that 
tries to grasp “beings as such and as a whole,” something quite different to the early Greek articulation 
of the event in which beings come to light in the first place. See, e.g., Martin Heidegger, Early Greek 
Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984). 
5 See, e.g., G. S. Kirk, “Natural Change in Heraclitus,” Mind 60 (1951): 35-42.   
6 J. Baird Callicott,  “A NeoPresocratic Manifesto,”170.  / Environmental Humanities 3 (2013) 
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articulate ways of living in the world together as the condition in which the world that the 
sciences explore manifests itself (humanities). Another way of putting this would be to revive 
the old scholastic and Spinozist distinction between natura naturata and natura naturans. The 
sciences explore nature natured, the humanities articulate nature naturing. One consequence 
of this view is that I think it would be preferable, if at all possible, to abandon the name 
‘humanities’ altogether. We live together in the world with myriad creatures that are far from 
human and the world that we live in is a far more-than-human world.
7 How then should we 
designate the two projects? Since most other possibilities would be confusing or unlikely, I 
suggest we call them the arts and sciences.
8 The unity of the University should be the unity in 
opposition of these two faculties, two opposing projects joined in their concern for the more-
than-human world. 
If  universities  could  be  persuaded  to  engage  in  some  principled  restructuring  along 
these lines it might involve the dissolution of the faculty of social sciences into those of the arts 
and  the  sciences.  Since  I  suspect  that  many  social  scientists  would  have  a  hard  time 
swallowing  the  idea  that  social  science  is  falsely  modelled  on  natural  science  and  that 
consequently “there is no such thing as a social science,” as some of my colleagues have 
argued, the faculty of sciences would be a faculty of both natural and social sciences working 
together or in tandem. Some social scientists might be persuaded that they are in fact social 
artists and critics. Of course, there should certainly be far more truck between the arts and 
sciences than there is currently between the humanities and natural sciences, but this should 
not lead us to confuse their two fundamentally distinct projects.
9 
Furthermore, the tasks of the environmental arts should be far more creative, critical 
and self-critical than Callicott tends to suggest.
10 Sometimes he comes perilously close to the 
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7 I take this phrase from David Abram, whom Callicott also cites with approval for his thoughts on the 
fundamental changes wrought by literacy on our ways of being in the world. David Abram, The Spell 
of the Sensuous (New York: Vintage Books, 1997). It is a little surprising that Abram’s chief influence, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who did so much to take the findings of the sciences seriously, is not 
mentioned in Callicott’s attack on phenomenological anti-naturalism. Callicott, “A NeoPresocratic 
Manifesto,”171,175. 
8 ‘Arts’ also have the advantage that etymologically the Latin ars denotes practical skill or craft, 
countering the assumption that only the sciences are of practical consequence. Further back the Greek 
artios meant ‘just’ and artizein ‘to prepare,’ with a common root in *ar (fit together or joint), all of 
which could be taken to suggest that the arts are the common articulation of a just and prepared life 
together.  
9 For a recent philosophical defence of the view that the social sciences are falsely modelled on the 
natural sciences see, Hutchinson, Read and Sharrock, There is No Such Thing as a Social Science 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008). For an earlier and in some ways even more stringent view see, Michel 
Henry, “The Ideologies of Barbarism,” in Barbarism (London: Continuum, 2012). For a general 
overview of the current situation and careful reflection on its prospects see, Jerome Kagan, The Three 
Cultures: Natural Sciences, Social Sciences and Humanities in the 21
st Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
10 Ultimately we might also want to question whether ‘environmental’ is the most appropriate term to 
describe the project in question. Perhaps the ‘ecological arts’ would be preferable. We need not follow 
what appears to be Callicott’s assumption that the term ‘ecology’ always refers primarily to ecological 
science as an integrated approach to biology, simply because Ernst Haeckel coined the term to refer to Greaves, Environmental Arts as First Philosophy /  
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view, rightly criticised by Ted Toadvine,
11 that the primary task of the environmental arts and 
humanities is to serve as public relations for the sciences:  
 
I  suggest  that  we  philosophers  and  humanists  generally  can  do  our  part  to  reintegrate 
science and its epistemology into the wider culture by expressing the new nature of Nature 
as revealed in the sciences, in the grammar of the humanities. The putatively “value-free” 
discourse of science—a mixture of mathematics, statistics, and technical terminology—is 
not  readily  or  easily  accessible.  The  discourse  of  the  humanities—rich  with  imagery, 
metaphor,  emotion,  and  honest  moral  judgement—resonates  with  a  much  wider 
audience.
12 
 
Although Callicott does later concede that the sciences must be open to the humanities just as 
much as the humanities must be open to the sciences, this remains a very weak vision of what 
the  environmental  arts  might  come  to  be.  The  arts  are  at  once  creative  and  critical.  Their 
primary purpose is not to disseminate the scientific worldview in an appealing language that is 
easily understood without a great deal of effort. They are not about propagating preformed 
worldviews at all, whether they be scientific, counter-scientific or anti-scientific. The purpose 
of the environmental arts is the creative experience and articulation of our ways of being in the 
more-than-human world, which involves the expansion, criticism and the occasional shattering 
of worldviews. 
Assuming that large-scale principled restructuring of faculties is a long way off, one 
might ask about the more immediate scholarly and pedagogical consequences of this view. 
The first such consequence would be that interdisciplinary environmental studies should not 
proceed on the assumption that we are all trying to say the same thing in different ways. We 
should  not  be  afraid  of  cross-disciplinary  critical  engagement.  Of  course,  this  can  only  be 
fruitful in the long term if we are also willing to put some serious effort into re-educating 
ourselves in the other disciplines with which we wish to engage. Critical self-reflection is also 
crucial, although often far harder in practice. Yet even after all of that we should not expect 
that  such  re-education  will  on  all  occasions  bring  sympathetic  consensus.  Nor  should  we 
assume that it has been a failure if it does not do so. The second consequence is that we 
should try to be patient if our colleagues in other faculties prioritize their own concerns and 
perhaps fail to see the urgency of forging new research and teaching links. They may often be 
right! A university working as a unified scholarly community does not have to rest upon the 
fundamental assumption of shared priorities and goals and the future of environmental thought 
does not have to rest upon the desire for ecotopian consilience. 
For  myself,  as  a  teacher  on  a  recently  developed  Master’s  course  in  Environmental 
Sciences and Humanities, I take from these reflections the following lessons. The course has 
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the study of all the conditions in which Darwinian ‘struggle’ takes place. Drawing on the etymological 
roots of the term as the study of what it is to ‘be at home,’ ‘ecology’ very quickly came to have a far 
richer and more complex set of references. Personally I think there are good arguments for and against 
using ‘environment’ and ‘ecology,’ not to mention ‘nature,’ as our core concepts in various different 
contexts.  
11 Ted Toadvine, “Six-Myths of Interdisciplinarity,” Thinking Nature 1 
www.thinkingnaturejournal.com/volume-1/ (accessed 5 Sept 2013) 
12 Callicott, “A NeoPresocratic Manifesto,”171.  / Environmental Humanities 3 (2013) 
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been enormously successful in drawing together researchers and teachers from two faculties at 
the university, Science and Humanities, that very rarely have anything to do with one another. 
It has drawn upon this range of expertise to create unique modules that do not simply arrange 
different disciplinary perspectives side by side, but really allow for communication and critical 
engagement. If such a course is to continue to have a radical effect on the way we think about 
the natural world then we must continue to seek for our often hidden unity in opposition. I 
have suggested that the search for unity cannot elide the fundamentally different aims of our 
respective projects in the arts and sciences, to articulate and criticise the ways of life through 
which nature manifests itself and to explore the nature that is so manifest. Faculty members 
from the Environmental Sciences have so far included mainly those who have a serious interest 
in social science of one kind or another.  We need to afford our students the opportunity for 
education and re-education in the natural sciences, while encouraging them to think carefully 
about whether an explicit dialogue between natural science and humanities really would be 
worthwhile and if so, precisely what it might achieve. We need to continue to think about the 
tasks and status of the social sciences and, if they have indeed often been falsely modelled on 
the  natural  sciences,  then  we  need  to  understand  the  specific  consequences  of  this  for 
environmental thought. Crucially, we must resist the assumption that the social sciences can 
act as mediators between natural sciences and the arts. They may, or may not, work at the 
points of highest tension between the two, but their questions and approaches cannot and 
should  not  attempt  to  fuse  the  two  projects  into  one.    Finally,  as  ‘humanists,’  one  of  our 
primary tasks should be to seek unity in opposition to ourselves, in reflective self-criticism. The 
first  such  self-critical  question  that  we  need  to  answer  is,  I  have  suggested,  whether  the 
environmental  humanities  as  such  have  a  future  at  all.  Or,  whether  they  should  perhaps 
transform themselves into the environmental arts, a creative and critical enterprise that seeks to 
understand our myriad ecologically entwined ways of being as they present and articulate the 
natural world to us, opening it up for the exploration of the various sciences. That would be a 
first philosophy for environmental thought that truly revived the first philosophy of the early 
Greeks. 
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